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Introduction 
 
For ages, mankind has waged war among its own kin. From as early as prehistory, until 
contemporary wars in the Levant, war is a means to settle disputes concerning wealth and riches, 
desire for power, and self-preservation. Almost as old as war itself, the rules of the game 
accompanying war regulate and limit the conduct of the parties. These rules limit the reasons 
to wage a war and limit the use of means and method during a war. Two bodies of rules can be 
identified in the laws of war. There are rules – whether moral or legal – that limit the legitimate 
reasons to start a war, which are called ius ad bellum, and there are rules that restrain the means 
(for example, weapons) and methods (for example, tactics) during a war, which are called ius 
in bello. 
 An early example of a rule to regulate warfare may be found in Sun Tzu’s tactical 
handbook The Art of war (ius in bello). It states that ‘the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s 
country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good, because a kingdom that has 
once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back 
to life’.1 Formulated differently, it is best to capture rather than destroy the enemy and its 
citizens. Another early example may derive from Jewish law, from the fifth book of the Old 
Testament. It states that ‘[y]ou must not cut down the fruit trees around that city. [...] But you 
may cut down the trees that you know are not fruit trees. You may use these trees to build 
weapons for making war against that city. You may use them until the city falls’.2 I can only 
assume that this is an implicit prohibition on starvation as a siege weapon and prohibition to 
destroy objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population. A more recent example 
is provided by Hugo Grotius, who states in his book De Iure Belli ac Pacis that ‘humanity will 
require that the greatest precaution should be used against involving the innocent in danger, 
except in cases of extreme urgency and utility’, whereby innocent is synonymous with civilian.3 
 I must emphasise that the first two examples are neither moral nor legal reasons, but 
prudential reasons to abstain from such actions. Minimalising collateral damage to civilians and 
the environment are a means to an end, instead of an end in itself. To preserve a conquered 
kingdom and its inhabitants gives the occupying kingdom the opportunity to continue its 
civilisation and expand its empire. The same prudential reason applies to the Biblical laws of 
 
1 Sun Tzu 2000, paras III.1, XII.21. 
2 Deuteronomy 20:19-20 (ERV). 
3 Grotius 2001, para III.XI.8. 
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war, for destroying the indispensable means for the survival of the civilian population after a 
siege renders an occupation useless. Grotius’ example seems beneficial for conducting global 
politics and, therefore, holds prudential reasons. However, unlike the Biblical and Chinese 
examples, his norm has intrinsic value. It does not reflect a codification of international laws of 
war; it does reflect a moral understanding of warfare. 
 The three examples of historical in bello norms centralise towards one subject: 
formulating moral norms to minimalise collateral damage during hostilities. In this thesis, I will 
focus on the minimisation of collateral damage to innocent civilians. To do that, I need to know 
how to implement moral norms in warfare. For that, I need a theory of warfare, which will help 
me to understand warfare, and how to implement moral norms. I have to find the theory of 
warfare which minimalises collateral damage in hostilities, and describe how the 
implementation of moral norms works towards minimalisation of collateral damage to innocent 
civilians in hostilities. I will formulate the following research question: 
  
 Which theory of warfare is theoretically acceptable and minimalises collateral damage 
 during hostilities, and which moral norms does that theory of warfare implement to 
 minimalise collateral damage? 
 
The methodology of this research is a qualitative literature research. The research question is 
composed of two parts that are discussed separately. First, I have to find a theoretically 
acceptable theory of warfare which minimalises collateral damage, and second, I have to find 
out which moral norms are implemented by the theory of warfare to minimalise collateral 
damage. This thesis consists of two parts, in accordance with the separation of the two elements 
of the research question. 
 There are four theories of warfare – realism, pacifism, traditionalism, and revisionism – 
which have different views on the nature of war and a different approach to implement moral 
norms in warfare.4 Realism, pacifism, traditionalism, and revisionism are theories of warfare that 
explain the relation between warfare and morality. Since the theory of warfare is a theory of 
relations, I must question whether a theory gives the best explanation about warfare, and question 
whether the application of the rules of warfare is right, and for this project specifically to 
minimalise collateral damage to civilians. I cannot exclude beforehand that there is no theory 
 
4 For realism, see Walzer 2015, p. 3 et seq., Lazar 2018, p. 32; for pacifism, see for example Walzer 2015, p. 329 
et seq.; for traditionalism and revisionism, see for example Lazar 2017, p. 37 et seq. 
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which is able to provide the best understanding of warfare and implements moral norms in order 
to minimalise collateral damage to civilians. The right theory of warfare must be theoretically 
acceptable in order to successfully implement moral norms in war. One must understand that it 
is a rule of war. Michael Walzer believes that in order ‘[t]o understand the rule, you have to take 
an interest not only in moral theory, which accounts for the strangeness of the rule, but in war 
itself, which accounts for the existence of the rule’.5 Implementation of norms in warfare is 
inseparable from the nature of war. As I will argue in the first chapter, the nature of war requires 
an exceptional implementation of moral norms in such a way that the implementation of moral 
norms is different in peacetime. Therefore, I need to have an understanding of warfare. If I want 
to restrict the combatant’s right to kill in order to respect the civilian’s right to life, I need a theory 
of warfare that answers both questions: which theory describes warfare right and which theory 
implements moral norms right? The most plausible theory of warfare is a theory that has the 
maximum explanatory power with smallest number of unexplained premises and is the most 
feasible to implement moral norms in warfare. 
 The first part of the thesis consists the first two chapters. In the first chapter, I must 
provide an answer to the descriptive question concerning the contents of these theories of 
warfare, and evaluate which theory provides the right understanding of warfare. It is part of 
finding the theoretically acceptable theory of warfare. I will provide a framework of two criteria 
to argue in favour of the best descriptive theory of warfare. Only if we have an understanding 
of the nature of war, it is possible to evaluate the implementation of norms in warfare. I will 
argue that traditionalism provides the best understanding of the nature of war. 
 The second chapter evaluates which theory of warfare implements moral norms in the 
right way. I will thereby focus on the minimalisation of collateral damage to innocent civilians. 
The moral right to life protects civilians from lethal force during hostilities. The moral right to 
kill provides combatants to fight a war. The evaluation of the right to life and the right to kill 
necessarily leads to an understanding of what the moral constraints that limit the use of the right 
to kill are. To argue in favour of the right theory of warfare, I will use the moral right to life 
and moral right to kill for the assessment. I will argue that traditionalism implements the moral 
right to life and moral right to kill in warfare in such a way that collateral damage to civilians 
is minimalised. 
 The third chapter aims to reconcile the moral right to life and the moral right to kill in 
warfare into a solid doctrine. The purpose of that doctrine is to minimalise collateral damage to 
 
5 Walzer 2015, p. 346. 
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innocent civilians while conducting hostilities against enemy combatants. Collateral damage to 
civilians violates their moral right to life. The response of traditionalism to this problem is the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. There are multiple versions to formulate the Doctrine of Double 
Effect, but all versions prescribe moral norms that limit the moral right to kill in warfare, 
whenever collateral damage to civilians is expected. It provides a moral framework to cope 
with the conflicting interests of the two opposing moral rights. I will assess the different 
versions in order to come up with the best formulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect that 
minimalises collateral damage to civilians. Historical examples as well as the contemporary 
legal standpoint on these matters are provided in context. 
 In recent wars, it has been harder to avoid collateral damage. In the last several decades 
the character of warfare itself shifted from a conventional nature to an asymmetrical nature. In 
asymmetric warfare enemy insurgents find cover in their own people’s homes and 
neighbourhoods. Any military action that follows, must take into account the densely populated 
areas in which they are operating. Thus, it becomes harder to avoid collateral killings. It is 
estimated that between 10,961 and 13,239 Afghan civilians were killed during the ISAF 
operations between October 2001 and October 2011, as opposed to 2,699 combatants of the 
allied ISAF forces, and an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Taliban were killed in the same 
timeframe.6 It is argued that between March 2003 until March 2013 during the Iraq War an 
estimated 134,000 to 250,000 civilians were killed as a result of hostilities, of whom 13 percent 
is recorded as collateral damage caused by the US Coalition.7 This research aims to contribute 
to the reduction of collateral damage caused by military operations to the civilian population, 
by formulating the right version of Doctrine of Double Effect that both recognises the right to 
life and the right to kill in warfare, thereby taking part in a socially relevant and controversial 
debate. 
 
 
 
6 Crawford 2011, p. 28. 
7 Crawford 2013, pp. 1, 6. 
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1. An introduction to the theories of warfare 
 
Central to the first chapter is to question the explanatory power of the theories of warfare, and 
argue in favour of the theory of warfare which provides the best understanding of the nature of 
war. But before I am able to discuss the four theories in detail, I must have an understanding on 
four key criteria that determine the explanatory power of the theories of warfare, namely 
exceptionalism, reductivism, collectivism, and reductivism. Two criteria oppose the other two 
criteria each other, which lead to two discussions: the discussion between exceptionalism and 
reductivism, and the discussion between collectivism and reductivism. I will argue that 
exceptionalism and collectivism are the right criteria to describe war. Combining exceptionalism 
and collectivism will lead to the acceptance of the Just War theory, which I will discuss in the 
third paragraph. Only then I am able to assess whether realism, pacifism, traditionalism, and 
revisionism comply with the criteria of exceptionalism and collectivism to describe war, and 
whether those theories embrace the Just War theory. I will argue that traditionalism is the only 
theory that complies with these criteria. 
 
1.1. Exceptionalism and reductivism 
The first discussion revolves around the question whether war is different from peacetime in such 
a way that it deserves a special moral treatment. There are two camps: those who think that war 
is exceptional and that the combatants who conduct the war abide to different moral norms 
(exceptionalism), and those who think that war and peacetime are alike, and that combatants must 
follow the moral norms that apply in peacetime as well (reductivism). 
 Exceptionalism starts by thinking about war itself: War is hell.8 What is the logic of war 
and why does anyone want to wage war with each other? It is a question that depends on the 
factors that make war a war, and how we judge the horrors of war. In general, how we judge 
the conduct of war depends on ‘how people get killed and on who those people are’.9 One may 
argue that killing is wrong, whatever the context, method and identity of the perpetrator and the 
victim are. But this is not in accordance with exceptionalism, which views killing during war 
distinct from domestic, ordinary killings. Warfare contains such horrendous properties that are 
not present in conflicts short of war, such as riots and civil unrest. These properties play a 
normative role in establishing ‘pretheoretical intuitions about the morality of war that are so 
 
8 Lazar 2018, p. 28; Walzer 2015, p. 22. 
9 Ibid. 
10 
 
hard to ground in reductivist reasons alone’.10 The extraordinary properties of war cannot be 
reduced to the same properties of peacetime. Walzer formulates several peculiar properties that 
separate a state of war from a state of peace. First, the circumstances of war are intensely 
coercive, and they are coercive in ways that are probably not equalled anywhere else.11 Second, 
war is a world of radical and pervasive uncertainty.12 According to exceptionalists, these 
properties justify (or prohibit) killing in war that do not justify killing outside of war.13 
Reductivists disagree with the notion that war is exceptional to an extent that it deserves a 
different moral treatment. According to Jeff McMahan: ‘The difference between war and other 
forms of conflict is a difference only of degree and thus the moral principles that govern killing 
in lesser forms of conflict govern killing in war as well. A state of war makes no difference 
other than to make the application of the relevant principles more complicated and difficult’.14 
Reductivists claim that the grounds on which the right to life is lost and the grounds of killing 
as a lesser evil justification are bound by the same principles in wartime and in peacetime.15 
This standpoint is criticised on two accounts: first, moderate reductivists argue that only one 
way to lose the right to life in war that is exceptionally vacant in peacetime is the liability to be 
killed in self- or other-defence. Not the status of being an enemy combatant, but the liability 
one brings upon oneself by posing a threat to another is what makes war exceptional. They 
accept exceptionalism to an extent. Second, moderate reductivists argue that intentional killing 
of those who retain their right to life can be a permissible lesser evil only if it is necessary to 
realise some extremely valuable goal. One such valuable goal is the supreme emergency, a 
military necessity, of which Walzer gives the example of the Allied terror bombing during the 
Second World War of German cities with the intent to kill civilians as the only offensive means 
of war the Allied forces had at that time to advance their victory.16 Killing in war is based on 
different justification, which makes war exceptional even in the eyes of the moderate 
reductivist. 
 It is clear to me that war is exceptional. Internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and domestic crimes such as homicide are common in 
 
10 Lazar 2018, p. 28. 
11 Walzer 2015, p. 339. 
12 Walzer 2015, p. 344. 
13 Lazar 2018, p. 22. 
14 McMahan 2009, p. 156. 
15 Lazar 2018, p. 24. 
16 Walzer 2015, p. 258. 
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most states. This type of violence falls within the jurisdiction of a state. In order to protect the 
safety of the state and its citizens, crime and punishment are governed by the sovereign rule of 
law of a state. But war falls outside the scope of its jurisdiction, so therefore war is an exception 
to the safeguard that the state provides for its citizens. Intense coerciveness and radical 
uncertainty shape the moral dilemmas in warfare. Both reductivist critiques are legitimate 
concerns, but I cannot favour reductivism at the expense of exceptionalism. To conclude, I 
argue that war is an exceptional circumstance that requires different morals in contrast to 
domestic affairs, which makes the argument of reductivism false. 
 
1.2. Collectivism and individualism  
I have concluded that war is exceptional. Now I need to settle the dispute between collectivism 
and individualism. Collectivism and individualism question the attribution of moral actions. 
Collectivism holds that morality in warfare is collectivised, and that the state bears moral 
responsibility and not the individual, whereas individualism holds that the individual soldier 
should not forsake moral responsibility.17 It is an important debate, because if one assumes that 
collectivism is valid, then one is forced to accept the moral equality of combatants. The moral 
equality of combatants is a doctrine which implies that every soldier participating in hostilities 
has an equal right to kill and liability to be killed by the enemy, whereas opponents who adhere 
to individualism argue that the doctrine is false and that there is no equal right to kill and liability 
to be killed by the enemy.18 Opponents of the doctrine of moral equality of combatants hold that 
the right to kill and liability to be killed are based upon other factors, such as contribution to the 
war effort, which I will elaborate on in the next chapter. First, I have to assess whether 
collectivism or individualism provides the best description of warfare. 
 When Walzer formulated war as hell, he was right on the first two characteristics of war: 
it is intensely coercive, and war is a world of radical and pervasive uncertainty. In addition, 
Walzer claims that war is an intensely collective and collectivising experience.19 And not only 
the collectiveness of the enterprise attests to the collectivism of war, also the coerciveness 
attributes to it. Coerciveness is determined by the collective urge to win the war, and the same 
collective contests radically both morality and authority.20 According to Walzer, morality is 
 
17 Lazar 2017, p. 40; Walzer 2015, pp. 340-341.  
18 Walzer 2015, pp. 36-37, 338. 
19 Walzer 2015, p. 340. 
20 McMahan 2006, p. 47. 
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collectivised in war, and thereby differs from morality in peacetime. In addition to Walzer, 
Lazar summarises the most common arguments in favour of collectivism. First, wars are large-
scale conflicts, in which the interests of many people are at stake. Second, there is widespread 
and egregious non-compliance with any principle that could plausibly govern killing outside of 
war. Third, there are political interests at stake, for example, preserving political sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Fourth, at least one party to the conflict is a state. Fifth, the conflict is 
governed by institutions, in particular the laws of war. Sixth, the conflict takes place against the 
backdrop of, and usually disrupts, the international state system.21 The collectivists reject 
individualism. They argue that some of the values that justify some killing in war are irreducibly 
collective or that the actions of which war is composed are irreducibly collective.22  
 McMahan believes that war changes nothing at all. The problem of war is that there is 
a lack of epistemic access to relevant facts in order to make the right moral judgment. There is 
no difference between morality in wartime and in peacetime, and, therefore, the rules of war 
‘should otherwise reflect as closely as possible the same principles of justice and liability that 
govern conduct outside war’.23 Also, individualists claim that war is an increased number of 
people who act with increasing coordination to defend both themselves and each other against 
a common threat.24 They hold that the collectiveness of war is only fiction. War is only a 
cumulation of individual interests. Therefore, McMahan believes in the individualist approach 
of morality in war, which is opposite to the collective approach of morality.  
 Walzer acknowledges that war is fought by individuals, but that these individual soldiers 
are ‘members of a collective, to which they attach […] great value, and they are engaged in a 
project that is not merely their own’.25 Lazar too, disagrees with the individualist approach. He 
thinks that to reduce the morality of war is ‘oddly dogmatic to confine our normative palette to 
these reasons alone’.26 He argues that ‘[w]ars have some distinctive properties that are relevant 
to the morality of killing. Typical examples include the sheer scale of the fighting, [...], the 
political and territorial goods at stake, the “fog of war,” the existence of institutions such as 
international law, and the fact that the conflict is fought by organized groups’.27 Lazar continues 
 
21 Lazar 2018, p. 29. 
22 Lazar 2018, pp. 22-23. 
23 McMahan 2006, p. 47. 
24 McMahan 2004b, p. 75. 
25 Walzer 2015, p. 341. 
26 Lazar 2017, p. 40. 
27 Ibid. 
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his list and concludes: ‘The laws of war matter morally. The institutions at stake matter morally. 
The collective character of military action matters. An exclusively reductivist [and 
individualist] account of the morality of war would be incomplete’.28  
 I agree with Walzer and Lazar. The collective interest in conducting a war surpass all 
individual interests. The collectiveness of war demands a collective morality, for war threatens 
not only the survival of individuals, but that of political survival of the state as well. The state 
forces individuals to fight for collective ideals. Thus, a collective approach is a better 
explanation for the morality of warfare than an individual approach. 
 
1.3. Just War theory 
In the previous two paragraphs, I have concluded that exceptionalism and collectivism give the 
best description that will fit a theory of warfare, at the expense of reductivism and 
individualism. In this paragraph, I will explain the Just War theory, because it combines both 
exceptionalism and collectivism as one descriptive theory.  
 The Just War theory is of catholic origin, with its most prominent author St. Thomas 
Aquinas. He formulates fundamental principles which form the bedrock of contemporary Just 
War theory. The most important principle adheres to exceptionalism and prescribes that there 
is a strict separation from ethics of war and ethics of warfare. 29 Ethics of war (ius ad bellum), 
are a body of rules and norms that assesses whether the reason to wage a war is legitimate. Ethics 
of warfare, also called (ius in bello), are a body of rules and norms that concerns how violence in 
war is conducted and against whom. The rightness of the conduct of combatants in war is not 
influenced by the question whether the war he is fighting for is just or unjust. Conversely, 
wrongful conduct of a combatant does not unjustify the war he is fighting for. For a Just War 
theorist, it makes perfect sense that a combatant of the Waffen-SS who is fighting against the 
Allies in an aggressive war that violates all ius ad bellum norms is a justified combatant, as long 
as he complies with the rules of warfare. Contributing to an unjust war by fighting well is not 
of his concern, for commencing an aggressive war is a state crime, not an individual crime. 
Similarly, if an Allied soldier fights Nazi-Germany to liberate occupied territories, and he 
commits war crimes, that does not turn his just war into an unjust one. The Just War theory 
adheres to collectivism as well. Since the Just War theory prescribes a separation of the two 
realms of the rules of war, ius in bello apply to every combatant equally. Explaining war as a 
 
28 Lazar 2017, p. 40. 
29 Aquinas 1920, II-II, q. 40 article 1 and II-II, q. 64, articles 2-3, 7. 
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collective matter result in the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants, which states that 
every combatant is morally equal in using force against its opponent, and they are equally bound 
to the moral norms.30 
 Now I have an understanding about the criteria to determine the nature of war, I will go 
into the details of the theories of warfare, and assess which theory of warfare includes both 
exceptionalism and collectivism as a part of the descriptive theory of the Just War. It enables me 
to determine which theory of warfare has the best explanatory power, and how we must apply 
moral norms that result from favouring one of the theories of warfare. I will elaborate on realism, 
pacifism, traditionalism, and revisionism. 
 
1.4. Realism and pacifism 
Realism is a theory that is concerned with international relations, and concerns war as well. 
Realism describes the relation between war and morality in a political way. According to  realism, 
states are the prime actors in international relations, for people tend to pursue their self-interests 
in formed groups. Realism is supported by the criterion of collectivism. 
 To pursue their interests, power politics are the means of realism. Aside from international 
relations between states, there is no higher political body to police political actions. Therefore, an 
anarchy between states exists. Exercising these powers is only constrained by practical reasons, 
and not by morality. It is because the prime self-interest of the state is survival at the expense of 
all other states, peoples, and values. One tool of power politics is war, and since power politics is 
devoid of morality, war is devoid of morality, too.31 In domestic circumstances morality prevails, 
yet this is not the case with regard to war. War is an activity that is situated outside society, in a 
no man’s land that is between societies. War is a different world, where self-interest and the 
necessity to survive prevail. In survival, ‘morality and law have no place. Inter arma silent leges: 
in time of war the law is silent’.32 Realism is also supported by the exceptionalist criterion. 
 So, does it mean that we have found a theory of warfare that is supported on the criteria 
of collectivism and exceptionalism? Realism explains the phenomenon of war in the right way; 
however, realism remains silent on the morality of war. There is none. I will provide an example. 
One may argue that each party to the conflict sees itself as the just side, where its existence is 
threatened by the adversary, who is the unjust aggressor. But in such situations, there is no justice, 
 
30 Walzer 2015, pp. 41, 44. 
31 Donnelly 2008, p. 150. 
32 Walzer 2015, p. 3. 
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for if morality is only talk, then justice is talk, too. In realism, there is no just side. There is no 
unjust side either. Each party acts in accordance with tits egoistic urge to self-preservation, which 
is not just but prudential. A possible solution would be to include morality in realism. The effect 
would be that parties to the conflict can argue that they have morality on their side, and that they 
are the just party, fighting the unjust adversary. However, ‘[m]oral talk is coercive; one thing 
leads to another’.33 Normative ethics limits actors in warfare to use any opportunity to fight 
towards victory. It negates the very essence of the theory of realism, because international 
relations would cease to be an anarchical world in which acts of groups are solely determined by 
self-interest. The main branches of ethics – meta-ethics, normative ethics and descriptive ethics 
– are not strictly separated. With regard to ethics in warfare, they are not only normative, but also 
descriptive. If one observes a rule that restricts actions of an actor, and if this restriction is not 
caused by any practical reason but by the conviction that an act should be limited because the 
consequences are undesirable, a moral normative judgment has been made, which, according to 
descriptive ethics, assumes the existence of morality in warfare. 
 But I have only to recall the examples of ancient rules of warfare stated in the introduction 
to observe a sense of a moral conviction in warfare. I conclude that war is not devoid of morality, 
that war is not only a clash of opposing self-interests, and that described moral rules of war do 
not lack normativity, especially rules of war that are not based on prudence. While realism is a 
collective and exceptional theory, it does not provide moral implications. Therefore, I argue that 
the theory of realism does not hold. 
  
The next theory of warfare that I am going to discuss is pacifism. Like realism, pacifism is a 
theory of international relations between states, and since war is a part of that, pacifism has its 
implications for the theory of war. What makes pacifism different from realism, is that pacifism 
includes morality as an indisputable and irreducible norm to comply with, which is the opposite 
of the realist theory that denies the existence of morality in warfare.  
 Pacifism stems from the two Latin words paci, meaning peace, and fixus, meaning 
making. Therefore, in order to understand pacifism, one must first understand peace. The most 
common understanding of peace is an absence of war. The desired end for a pacifist is thus a 
non-war situation. Pacifism can also mean non-violent, the absence of violence altogether. It is 
emphasised that peace-making can be distinguished into positive peace and negative peace. The 
desired end of positive peace is the absence of structural violence, and the desired end of 
 
33 Walzer 2015, p. 12.  
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negative peace is the absence of personal violence.34 In terms of war, negative peace is an 
obligation to abstain from war, while positive peace is an obligation to structurally supress 
underlying driving factors that may contribute to the emergence of war. Both obligations are 
imposed upon the state, which makes attaining peace a collective aim. 
 There are several levels of collective pacifism in order to attain peace. The foremost 
levels of pacifism are absolute pacifism and contingent pacifism. Absolute pacifism holds that 
the use of violence is unjustified, whatever the circumstances. Since exercising violence is an 
integral part of warfare, war is deemed unjustified. Pacifism is supported on the reductivist 
criterion. Opposed to Just War theorists, pacifism holds that war is an unacceptable means for 
obtaining peace. Absolute pacifists will argue that the war against the Nazi, Fascist, and 
Imperial Axis powers was an unjust war, too. Immoral actions shouldn’t be stopped by other 
immoral actions.35 For ‘even military action aimed at protecting people against acute and 
systematic human-rights violations cannot be justified’.36 Absolute pacifism is a deontological 
theory focussed on a rule. The rule that pacifism holds as non-negotiable is the right to life. 
This right must not be infringed whatever the costs.  
 Contingent pacifism holds that wars are in principle justifiable, but most, if not all wars 
in the past and future are unjustified for the violence they employ. Nevertheless, contingent 
pacifism shares some similarities with the Just War theory, for it believes that a war can be just if 
it is waged in order to stop a greater suffering. An example of such a war is a humanitarian 
intervention.37 Still, ‘very few wars are worth fighting, and that the evils of war 
are almost always greater than they seem to excited populations at the moment when war breaks 
out’, as Bertrand Russell argues for relative pacifism.38 Contingent (or relative) pacifism may 
be referred to as Just War pacifism, for only when the cause of a war is just, pacifism will accept 
the use of violence in order to achieve that goal.39  
 Pacifism is not the right theory of warfare. While pacifism complies with the description 
given by collectivism, it does not comply with exceptionalism, but with reductivism. Since I 
have already argued that we need an exceptional and collective theory, pacifism does not fit the 
mould. Second, the theory of pacifism is a contradiction. Absolute pacifists hold that war is 
 
34 Galtung 1969, p. 183. 
35 Fox 2014, p. 127. 
36 Fox 2014, p. 126. 
37 May 2015, pp. 44-45, 59. 
38 Russell 1943, p. 8. 
39 Sterba 1998, p. 151. 
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always immoral, even when a humanitarian intervention is deployed to defend the innocent. 
Therefore, by avoiding violence, pacifists cannot avoid deprivations of lives. To what extent, 
then, do pacifists honour the right to life? An answer is provided by the contingent pacifists, 
who claim that war may be used in such circumstances, but that there are only a few, if any, 
examples of historical situations in which waging a non-aggressive war was justified. But, by 
holding this belief, contingent pacifism has more in common with the Just War theory and 
traditionalism, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
1.5. Traditionalism and revisionism 
In the contemporary ethics and laws of war, the right to life and the right to kill in warfare are 
most influenced by traditionalism and criticised by revisionism. Military necessity is an alien 
term for the pacifist, and morality in war is alien to the realist. However, contrary to realism 
and pacifism, both traditionalism and revisionism acknowledge the percularities of warfare and 
reconcile morality with military necessity to win wars.  
 Traditionalism is the theory of warfare that assumes that only states have the right to 
wage war. A war involves at least one party that is a state: either the war is between two or 
more states, or between at least one state and one or more non-state parties to the conflict. War 
is a collective enterprise, fought by individuals for the collective ideals of the state.40 
Traditionalism holds that morality in warfare collectivised. Traditionalism assumes that 
morality in war is different from morality in peacetime. Moral judgments are based on different 
moral norms and different epistemic facts, depending on whether one is in a state of war or a 
state of peace. Traditionalism holds that the morality of warfare adheres to exceptionalism. The 
criteria of collectivism and exceptionalism are supported by the traditionalist idea that war is 
governed by public international law. For that reason, traditionalism is sometimes referred to 
as legalism.41 The laws of war are a product of the Just War theory. The contemporary laws of 
war make a distinction between the right to wage war (ius ad bellum, governed by the laws of 
the United Nations) and the right in warfare (ius in bello, governed by international 
 
40 Walzer 2015, p. 341. 
41 MacCormick 1989, p 184. Legalism is a moral theory which holds that acts are morally sound if these acts 
comply with ‘predetermined rules of considerable generality and clarity’, which are laws. To fight a just war in 
accordance with justice means to abide the laws of war. 
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humanitarian law).42 Traditionalists hold that both realms are disconnected, in accordance with 
the Just War theory. As stated earlier, wrongs in ius in bello does not affect the legal and moral 
status of ius ad bellum, and international humanitarian law codifies the belief in the Just War 
theory in public international law. Traditionalism complies with the criteria of exceptionalism 
and collectivism. Thereby, traditionalism embraces the Just War theory. And unlike realism, 
traditionalism does not exclude morality from warfare. But before I can conclude that 
traditionalism is the right theory of warfare that provides the best understanding of warfare, I 
must assess whether revisionism is an even better theory. 
  
Revisionism is a theory of warfare that came about as a reaction to traditionalism. According 
to Lazar, ‘[r]evisionists are not a unified camp; they share only their rejection of Walzer’s 
orthodoxy’.43 Revisionism focusses on two traditionalist approaches: there are moral 
revisionists, rejecting the moral framework of traditionalism, and there are legal revisionists, 
rejecting the idea that the laws of war reflect the most favourable moral rules that apply in war. 
The dispute between traditionalists and legal revisionists is also a dispute between 
institutionalism and non-institutionalism. Often, traditionists are institutionalists and legal 
revisionists are non-institutionalists.44 Institutionalism refers to the idea that morality is a 
concern of institutions, whether it is a state or an international organisation. Institutions are 
more able to observe the long-term effects of the laws of war and respond to that with 
establishing coercive laws of war, whereas having concerns with individual interests might not. 
Therefore, norms that regulate war and norms that regulate domestic affairs differ. For example, 
Henry Shue argues that the laws of war concerning killing are more permissive than in domestic 
contexts, because the laws of war presuppose the acceptability of resorting to broad forms of 
violent self-help, whereas resorting to violence in domestic contexts is unnecessary for there 
are institutional ways to achieve justice.45 This is the result of the fact that ‘war breaks out 
where impartial institutions are yet to be created or any existing impartial institutions are 
thought by at least one party to have failed to protect their vital interests, apparently leaving 
 
42 The Geneva Conventions from as early as 1864 were adopted to restrict the means and methods of warfare. 
These conventions ruled ius in bello, while the laws of the United Nations since 1945 ruled ius ad bellum. Both 
bodies of laws are independent from each other. 
43 Lazar 2018, p. 22. 
44 Lazar 2017, p. 38. 
45 Shue 2013, p. 273. 
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violent self-help as the only resort’.46 Non-institutionalists, on the other hand, believe that 
morality in war refers to the acts of the individual who conducts the war and that ‘acts can be 
right or wrong independent of how they relate to existing or hypothetical institutions’.47 The 
question of whether the right to kill trumps the right to life will be assessed on the level of the 
individual. Institutional considerations, such as military necessity, are of no object. Most 
revisionists, however, are not legal revisionists but moral revisionists. 
 Moral revisionists argue that international law that governs the laws of war is a 
pragmatic fiction and that it lacks deeper moral foundations.48 One moral foundation on which 
the laws of war ought to be based, is the infringeable right to life. Revisionists that hold this 
conviction are siding with the absolute pacifists, while there are revisionists who hold similar 
beliefs as the contingent pacifist. They believe that in certain circumstances, someone loses his 
right to life, and thus becomes liable to be killed.49 Most significantly, traditionalists and moral 
revisionists disagree on two elements that construct the framework of the morals of warfare.  
  It is of no surprise that most revisionists are reductivists and believe that there is nothing 
peculiar about war to such an extent that it requires a different moral belief. Furthermore, most 
revisionists hold the individualist standpoint, as opposed to the traditionalists who hold that 
norms in warfare are collectivised.  
 Both traditionalists and revisionists agree that there must be ‘codes of conduct and laws 
of war that are sensitive to the nature of war and that would […] mitigate rather than exacerbate 
the terrible effects of war’.50 However, revisionists aim to reinterpret the morality of conducting 
a war, so much so that the contemporary laws of war cannot remain. In their view, it is unlikely 
that the prevailing war convention that Walzer (as one of the foremost traditionalist) has 
defended, is ‘the best compromise between our fundamental convictions about justice and 
liability and the necessity of having workable rules adapted to the complexities of war’.51  
 To clarify, McMahan provides two examples to alter the laws of war. First, the view of 
collectivism is that ‘in war a person is liable to attack by virtue of posing a threat and that a 
combatant’s status is “collectivised” in that he counts as posing a threat simply by being a 
 
46 Shue 2013, p. 273. 
47 Lazar 2017, p. 38. 
48 Lazar 2017, p. 37. 
49 Lazar 2018, p. 22. 
50 McMahan 2006, p. 51 
51 Ibid. 
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member of the military’.52 Revisionists argue against the moral equality of combatants. 
Theorists like McMahan are called individualists because they hold that permissible killing both 
in war and outside of it are interpersonal interactions between individuals.53 Posing an unjust 
threat to an innocent civilian is exemplary for the interpersonal interaction. Second, ‘because 
non-combatants do not pose a threat, they cannot be liable to attack’.54 In contrast, McMahan 
claims that ‘some are more responsible than others and the degree of their individual liability 
varies with the degree of their responsibility’, which is an individualist approach of morality in 
war.55 Individualism disregards the traditionalist doctrine of the moral equality of combatants 
because only on bases of individual liability a distinction should be made, and not because they 
happen to be soldiers. 
 It seems that McMahan agrees with Walzer’s description of warfare – the coerciveness, 
the collectiveness, and the radical uncertainty – for stating that, of course, ‘reliable information 
about the degree of an individual’s moral responsibility is never available in conditions of 
war’.56 But he continues by not acknowledging that a combatant’s liability is collectivised. The 
combatant’s liability remains on the level of the individual. Again, McMahan concedes by 
agreeing with Walzer’s observation that individual moral responsibility may affect his fellow 
brothers in arms, as a collective moralisation of war.  
 I argue that revisionism is not the right theory to describe warfare. The theory is based 
on the argument of reductivism and the argument of individualism. It is of no surprise that the 
Just War theory is not supported by revisionist. Yet the theory of warfare we need should argue 
in favour of exceptionalism and collectivism, and should embrace the Just War theory, and the 
doctrine that subsequently follows: the moral equality of combatants. 
 
1.6. Interim conclusion 
I have presented the four theories of warfare to provide a description of warfare, and my 
conclusion is that traditionalism is the right theory of warfare with the most explanatory power. 
Realism supports on exceptionalism and collectivism, but denies the existence of morality in 
warfare. Pacifism supports on reductivism and collectivism, at the expense of the crucial 
argument of exceptionalism. Revisionism does not comply on either of the two criteria that I 
 
52 McMahan 2006, p. 48. 
53 Lazar 2018, p. 22. 
54 McMahan 2006, p. 51. 
55 Ibid. 
56 McMahan 2006, p. 48. 
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believe are valid (exceptionalism and collectivism). Consequently, it leaves me to support 
traditionalism, for it is supported by both exceptionalism and collectivism, applies the Just War 
theory in practice, and supports the moral equality of combatants. In the next chapter, I will 
introduce two fundamental rights that are in conflict when we want to solve the problem of 
collateral damage to innocent civilians as a result of hostilities, carried out by combatants. I am 
talking about the right to life and the right to kill. I must assess which theory of warfare 
implements rightly the moral rights in war. 
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2. To live and to kill in war 
 
The right theory of warfare is the theory that explains the relation between warfare and morality 
best. In the previous chapter I have argued that traditionalism provides the best description of 
war, contrary to realism, pacifism, and revisionism. But I am not yet finished with assessing the 
theories. As I have noted, my methodology demands a twofold assessment: describing warfare, 
and implementing morality in warfare. This chapter concerns the second assessment in which the 
moral right to life and right to kill in the context of warfare are explored. After establishing the 
definition of the moral right to life, the conditions that terminate or override the right to life are 
formulated. I need to find the theory of warfare which provides the right implementation of these 
rights in order to minimalise collateral damage. 
 
2.1. The right to life 
Lazar believes that almost all contemporary Just War theorists agree that people have a 
presumptive right not to be killed. He sees this as an additional moral protection to their interest 
in survival.57 But it is debatable that the right not to be killed is synonymous with the right to life. 
For what is the right to life? Both philosophy as well as human rights law argue that there is a 
universal right to life, which will be discusses subsequently. 
 A right to life is the recognition that life has an intrinsic value, apart from instrumental 
values such as biological concerns. Intrinsic value is given by a belief of humans that life has 
value in itself. The belief of an intrinsic value of human life has been given most prominently by 
religion and philosophy. I will provide some examples and start with the former. It is assumed 
that ‘[a]ll of the great religious traditions share a universal dissatisfaction with the world as it is 
and a determination to make it better by addressing the meaning of human life, the worth and 
dignity of all persons, and, consequently, the duty toward those who suffer’.58 To use 
Christianity as an example, several verses from the Bible testify to the thought that there is an 
intrinsic value of a human life. When Moses descended from Mount Sinai, God provided the 
Jewish people with Ten Commandments, of which ‘Thou shalt not kill’ was the first.59 I can 
argue similarly against this Commandment as I did against Lazar: does a prohibition to kill 
entail a right to life? Christianity assumes it does entail a right to life. The Commandment on 
 
57 Lazar 2018, p. 23. 
58 Lauren 2003, p. 5. 
59 Exodus 20:13 (SIV). 
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the prohibition to kill stems from the idea that humans are created in the image of God.60 There 
is something divine in humans that is unlike in other living creatures. Human life has no 
instrumental value, for then utilitarian calculations rule who is and who is not allowed to live. 
Religion regards human life as an intrinsic value which is given by God, and only He is allowed 
to take back what He has given. The intrinsic value of a human life is also universal within 
Christianity. God bestows divinity on a human life through His image, which makes the value 
of human life universal. Additionally, Christianity is not the only religion that recognises that 
life is divine, in fact, it ‘is evident that a broad cross section of human cultures operates from a 
starting point of according special value to human life, despite not always living up to their 
ideals, suggests that it is, and always has been, a global value’.61 While a Commandment is a 
non-consequentialist idea, it does not entail a universal right, or a human right, for these 
conceptions were unknown to humans until modern times.  
 For a recent conception of universal human right to life, the moral theory of rule-
deontology of Immanuel Kant provides a starting point. Rule-deontology holds that complying 
with moral norms is a moral duty. The moral norms in rule-deontology are derived from logic. 
Kant derives such logic from the subject of the value of human lives. A human life has an 
absolute worth in itself, with an end in itself that could be a ground of determinate laws. This 
law is the categorical imperative.62 The categorical imperative states that you should ‘act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a 
universal law’.63 The principle of action is called a maxim. And one of the maxims is that you 
use humanity always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.64 The end in itself 
of humanity applies to all, without any epistemic access required to know the principle. The 
value of human lives is thus universal and objective, and its maxim is the universal law.65 
Through every human life a universal law is given by existing, and acting in accordance with 
its maxims, a Kingdom of Ends is established.66 Rule-deontology supplements the Christian 
tradition of the sanctity of human life, forming it as a right to life as a universal human right. 
 
60 Genesis 1:27 (SIV). 
61 Wicks 2010, p. 28. 
62 Kant 1997, para 4:428. 
63 Kant 1997, para 4:421. 
64 Kant 1997, para 4:429. 
65 Kant 1997, paras 4:431-432. 
66 Kant 1997, para 4:433. 
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The important difference is that human life is not a reflection of God, but human life is valued 
in itself.67 
 The aforementioned examples have led to the codification of the universal human right 
to life. The first explicit codification of the right to life was made by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948. The General Assembly of the United Nations codified thirty 
individual rights which affirm the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family’.68 Article 3 of the Declaration states that 
everyone has the right to life.69 In combination with the preamble of the Declaration, the right 
to life is an inalienable and universal right. The right to life kept its unconditional character as 
a moral norm of rule-deontology. However, into the practical application of the norm, some 
consequentialist and non-deontological exceptions to the rule emerged. Although the 
Declaration has no legal power, its influence is unprecedented. It became the source of all other 
international human rights treaties, and is considered a major field of research in international 
law, alongside the laws of war.  
 
2.2. The right to kill 
The moral right to life is the result of the universal value which humans bestow on human life. 
The moral right to life has resulted in a legal right to life, that is codified in several international 
human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the American Convention on 
Human Rights of 1969 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, and in 
many constitutions of states around the world.70 The legal right to life is universal and it seems 
absolute, but, in fact, it is not. Many legal norms maintain a codified exception to its absoluteness. 
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not prohibit the death 
penalty, and while the European Convention on Human Rights does prohibit the death penalty, it 
does not prohibit killing in time of war and other public emergencies. According to international 
treaties, moral pervasiveness of Kant’s rule-deontology on the right to life is in decline, for there 
are many legal options left to deprive someone from his right to life in times of extreme calamities. 
 
67 Wicks 2010, p. 31. 
68 Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
69 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
70 Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights; article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights; article 4 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. 
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In order to solve the opposing innocent’s right to life and combatant’s right to kill, I will turn to 
ethics and start with religion. 
 In Christianity, it is assumed that murder is a sin. It is also a sin to kill a murderer.71 But 
does that mean that we can never use lethal force, similar to pacifism? Aquinas objects to this 
idea by stating that if ‘the good incur no danger [the good are not forced to kill a sinner if they 
are at risk themselves], but rather are protected and saved by slaying the wicked, then the latter 
may be lawfully put to death [emphasis added]’.72 Not only is there an instrumental value of 
stripping one’s right to life away from him to protect other’s right to life, Aquinas assumes that 
a sinner has lost his right to life, for ‘he departs from the order of reason and consequently falls 
away from the dignity of his manhood’.73 Therefore, it seems that a sinning combatant becomes 
liable to be attacked. It is requisite that the sinner is condemned to death by a public authority 
for the common good, and the executor of that judgment is not to blame, because even ‘a soldier 
slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign’.74 One of the pillars of this mandated service is 
of St. Augustine’s, who states that ‘a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for 
oneself but for others, having the power to do so’.75 Combatants may exercise their right to kill 
against the adversary in order to protect and save the good. It is similar to the Just War theory 
and the theory of the moral equality of combatants, for they are not to be held responsible for 
the war they are fighting, only the public authority for whom they are fighting.  
 The right to life is a deontological moral norm. Saving a person’s life by killing another 
is not based on a utilitarian argument. ‘Killing someone who retains that right cannot be justified 
by the mere fact that doing so would realize a marginally greater good for someone else’.76 The 
right to life is a product of the non-consequentialist theory. Therefore, ‘killing is permissible if 
and only if either the target has somehow lost the protection of his right to life or he has not lost 
that protection but the good achieved by killing him is sufficiently great to render killing him 
permissible, thus overriding his right’.77  
 
71 Aquinas 1920, II-II, q. 64, article 2, objection 1. 
72 Aquinas 1920, II-II, q. 64, article 2, reply to objection 1. The may seems to suggest that it is not obligatory for 
the good to condemn the wicked. 
73 Aquinas 1920, II-II, q. 64, article 2, reply to objection 3. 
74 Aquinas 1920, II-II, q. 64, article 3, replies to objection 1-2. 
75 Augustine 1887, para 5. 
76 Lazar 2018, p. 23. 
77 Ibid. 
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 Aquinas provides us an example of the second justification to kill. There must be a 
sufficiently greater good achieved by killing someone who has retained his right to life. Aquinas 
believes that ‘[i]t is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, 
provided it harms nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue 
of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts 
for the welfare of the whole’.78 Quinn argues that Aquinas claims that the only obstacle to taking 
a life against his right is a utilitarian calculation, for his rule of thumb is the combined welfare 
of all people.79 I disagree with Quinn’s interpretation for three reasons. First, I believe that the 
rule of proportionality he is advocating is an additional condition among other conditions. 
Second, there needs to be a necessity, a goal achieved that is greater than respecting one’s right 
to life. In warfare, the military necessity is such a sufficiently greater good.80 Lazar adds that 
killing must not have adverse consequences; for example: only one person knows how to cure 
cancer. For him, the lesser evil condition is sufficiently able to solve this problem.81 The lesser 
evil condition adds a deontological condition next to the utilitarian calculation of the rule of 
proportionality. Third, there must be an obligation to discriminate between those who have lost 
their right to life or those whose right to life does not outweigh the military necessity, and those 
who are protected by their right to life. We must remember that there are civilians in war who 
we need to protect. 
 I have provided an understanding of the right to life, and which non-consequentialist 
and utilitarian limits there are to take someone’s right to life. I will now assess which theory of 
warfare provides the right implement the moral right to life and moral right to kill in warfare. 
 
2.2.1. Pacifism and realism on the right to kill  
I will start with discussing pacifism and how this theory incorporates morality in warfare. 
According to Lazar, a loss of the right to life can include consent, liability in self- or other-
defence, and a loss of one’s right that depended on the persistence of favourable background 
conditions so that when those conditions are absent, the right no longer obtains.82 With regard 
 
78 Aquinas 1920, II-II, q. 64, article 3, reply to objection 3. 
79 Quinn 1993, p. 175. 
80 Walzer 2015, pp. 129, 258. 
81 Lazar 2018, p. 24. 
82 Ibid. With contractarianism, I mean that there is a contract of consent between the killer and the victim. Act-
consequentialism means that there is a utilitarian calculation, whether in total or on average, of the consequences 
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to the latter example, an absolute pacifist will argue that no one will lose his right permanently 
or for the time being. They hold that the right to life is a rule-deontological norm, which has 
value in itself, and this norm cannot be violated even in the face of death to others (in which 
self- or other-defence would prevent this from happening). The pacifist – if it is necessary to 
wage a war anyway because they may be drawn into one – has ‘only one alternative, and that 
is non-violent defence, ‘a war without weapons’’.83 They depend on the assumption of the non-
combatant immunity as a part of the traditionalist Just War theory, for it will be immoral to kill 
peaceful protesters.84 This does not hold, because the pacifist theory is based on reductivism, 
claiming that wartime is no different than peacetime. A pacifist cannot embrace the Just War 
theory, because war is exceptional in the Just War theory. Furthermore, pacifists reject the 
moral equality of combatants, because there is no equal moral right to kill each other. In fact, 
there is no moral right to kill at all. To wage a war without weapons and to hide behind a 
doctrine which pacifism does not embrace is a theoretical contradition.  
 A contingent pacifist will argue that such loss of the right to life occurs only in order to 
avert a greater loss of human lives that is caused by immense human evil. In a utopian pacifist 
world, which is far from reality, a war would cause almost no deaths and violations of the right 
to life, for there is almost no right to take one. However, the result will emerge only if all parties 
to the conflict observe the pacifist norms. There is no reason for me to assume that all parties 
to the conflict will. It is quite imaginable that one or more parties to the conflict operate 
peacefully, but in case of aggressive war or an oppressive and racist occupier, this modus 
operandi will not prevent more deaths than violent resistance. Walzer views that a pacifist will 
only be victorious when soldiers (or their officers or political leaders) refuse at some early point 
to carry out or support a terrorist policy before civilian endurance is exhausted by non-violent 
resistance.85 Walzer, who refers to Basil Liddel Hart, states that achieving victory is only 
possible ‘against opponents whose code of morality was fundamentally similar, and whose 
ruthlessness was thereby restrained’.86 I do not think that pacifism protects the right to life on a 
similar level as other theories. The peculiarities of war must comply with very limited 
conditions for the pacifist theory to work. In other cases, I believe that more lives are lost due 
 
of the acts. With non-consequentialism, I mean that there is a rule or principle with intrinsic value that makes it 
impossible to make a calculation of rightness and wrongness of the consequences of the acts. 
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to a pacifist conviction of one or more of the parties to the conflict, during hostilities as well as 
during an occupation. Pacifism is not practically feasible, because pacifism denies people the 
means (namely, the right to kill) to protect their right to life 
  
In contrast to the pacifist theory, the realist theory does not include moral norms in warfare. I 
will regard this as exceptionalism ad absurdum, for the realist theory does not include any 
notion of the right to life. Realists are willing to wage an absolute war, in which ‘there is no 
imaginable act of violence, however treacherous or cruel, that falls outside of war’.87 There are 
no moral norms in realism, so there is no right to life, and subsequently no right to kill. If there 
was a right to kill, analogous reasoning would suppose that in the absence of such moral right, 
there is a moral norm that prohibits killing. Since there is no such right in an absolute war, there 
is no right to kill in the eyes of the realist either. If there is a right to kill in warfare, it is either 
a legal or a practical right that accounts only to the rules of military necessity. I have already 
argued that descriptive ethics observe moral norms in warfare, which refutes the realist 
argument. Additionally, denying the existence of moral norms in warfare denies the existence 
of the right to life and the right to kill. To conclude, the realist approach cannot respect the right 
to life of innocent civilians during hostilities. 
  
2.2.2. Traditionalism on the right to kill 
I haven’t found a theory that implements moral norms in warfare, in order to respect the lives 
of civilians yet. I will continue with traditionalism. Traditionalists hold that combatants have 
the right to kill in warfare. They favour the Just War theory, stating that there is a clear 
separation between two bodies of laws of war. Therefore, both combatants of the just party to 
the conflict and combatants of the unjust party to the conflict side have the same moral right to 
use force and kill.88 What differs ius ad bellum with ius in bello, is when the former wages a 
war of aggression the war-makers have no licence to do so, while in the latter case the 
combatants have a licence to participate in warfare.89 Traditionalists hold that war is exceptional 
 
87 Walzer 2015, p. 23. 
88 Some commentators use the term unjust combatant. I argue that this term is confusing for two reasons. First, 
some revisionists hold that the Just War theory is false. They assume that both bodies of the laws of war influence 
each other. A combatant who is fighting for the unjust party to the conflict is in their view an unjust combatant, 
and should lay down his arms. Second, an unjust combatant may very well refer to a combatant who has violated 
the laws of war, but which adjective does not make explicit whether he fights for a just or an unjust cause.  
89 Walzer 2015, p. 37. 
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and a collective enterprise. Therefore, ‘we must abstract from all consideration of the justice of 
the war; we must treat both combatants on the assumption that each believes himself in the right 
[…]’.90 Additionally, combatants share mutual consent of the use of force, and share a servitude 
to the party for whom they are fighting.91 Traditionalists conclude that combatants on either 
side of the war have an equal right to kill, as long as they comply with the norms for who they 
may kill and how they may kill them. Every combatant is morally equal in using force against 
its opponent, and they are equally bound to the moral norms.92  
 The moral equality of combatants does not grant civilians a right to kill; only combatants 
have an equal moral right to kill. Therefore, traditionalists believe in the distinction between 
combatants and civilians, the former liable to be attacked no matter their contribution to the war 
effort, the latter protected against direct attacks. The rule does not explicitly but implicitly state 
that there is a difference in moral value of the lives of a combatant and a civilian. Regarding 
the right to kill and the proportionality rule, traditionalists, like Thomas Hurka, don’t believe 
that killing enemy combatants is wrong – except for the method of killing that is used. For as 
long there is a military necessity to kill an enemy adversary, combatants are justified to do so. 
There is no proportionality rule to be applied, because their lives are morally equal. 
Traditionalists would argue that there is a moral equality between combatants, which assumes 
that the value of a fellow combatant’s life is similar to that of a foreign combatant. However, 
Hurka disagrees by arguing on the basis of common-sense morality that the life of a fellow 
combatant is of a higher moral value in contrast to that of the foreign combatant.93 Since there 
is a value difference between combatants, Hurka denies the moral equality of combatants. I 
believe that Hurka’s observation is wrong. The Just War theory does not grant the predicates 
just and unjust to combatants. Their allegiance is irrelevant for the question of whether their 
conduct is right or wrong. Favouring a fellow combatant at the expense of a foreign combatant 
implies a value difference, which is not in accordance with the moral equality of combatants in 
the Just War theory.  
 The fact that civilians have no right to kill but are not liable to be killed either, means 
that civilians should not be attacked. Combatants have no right to attack civilians. And if it is 
likely that combatants carry out an attack in which innocent civilians are harmed indirectly, 
 
90 Sidgwick 2012, p. 253. 
91 Walzer 2015, p. 38. 
92 Walzer 2015, pp. 41, 44. 
93 Hurka 2011, p. 261. 
31 
 
traditionalism presents a doctrine to reconcile the prohibition against attacking civilians with 
the legitimate conduct of military activity: the Doctrine of Double Effect.94 I conclude that 
traditionalism implements moral norms to protect the right to life of the civilian in war in the 
right way. But I have to take revisionism into consideration first, before I will call traditionalism 
the right theory of warfare. 
 
2.2.3. Revisionism on the right to kill 
Traditionalism is challenged by revisionists most prominently on four accounts, two of which 
I want to highlight: questioning civilian immunity and their right to life, and questioning the 
legitimacy of combatants who are fighting for wrongful aims and their right to kill.95  
 Reductive individualism assumes that the same conditions apply for intentional killing 
in warfare as outside of war, and the lesser evil justification in case of unintentional killing is 
not different in war. In the first case, intentional killing is only justified if it is ‘either 
unavoidably [to kill] in pursuit of an extremely valuable goal, or there is [a liability] to be killed 
in self- or other-defence where killing them is necessary and proportionate to that end [emphasis 
added]’.96 That person becomes an unjustified threat to another person. However, such an 
extremely valuable goal is very rare. Intentional killing in warfare would become obsolete. With 
regard to unintentional killing, it is ‘either unavoidably [to kill] in the pursuit of a sufficiently 
valuable goal, or there is [a liability] to be killed in self- or other-defence where killing them is 
necessary and proportionate to that end [emphasis added]’.97 According to Lazar, these 
conditions are not peculiar only to war, therefore he adds: ‘None of the properties that render 
killing the liable necessary and proportionate, and killing the nonliable a permissible lesser evil, 
justifies killing only in war’.98   
 Central to reductive individualism is the inclusion of a justification to kill and liability 
to lose the right to life, rather than being based on a status of combatant or civilian. McMahan 
does not believe that being a combatant makes him liable to be killed (thus, losing one’s right 
to life), but believes that the contribution that the combatant makes to the violation of the right 
to life of an innocent civilian. Even posing a threat makes a combatant liable, as McMahan 
states: ‘What makes a person morally liable to force or violence that is necessary to eliminate 
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an unjust threat is moral responsibility for initiating or sustaining the threat’.99 Revisionists 
argue that the moral equality of combatants is wrong on two accounts. First, in peaceful 
domestic affairs the right to life and the right to kill are not based on a status, but based on 
justifications and liabilities. Many combatants shall not be liable to attack, for their contribution 
to the war effort is below the threshold of posing an unjustified threat to another person, and 
some civilians will be liable to attack for they pose an unjustified threat to another person. Take 
for example, ‘a reluctant conscripted soldier and a war-mongering munitions manufacturer. Is 
the latter someone who should never be killed and the former someone who can always be 
killed’?100 Second, revisionists hold the inseparable character of ius ad bellum and ius in bello. 
Revisionists believe that combatants of an unjust party to the conflict are unjustified to kill, and 
they can only lay down their arms to comply with moral norms. To provide an example, Chief 
British Prosecutor Hartley Shawcross at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal stated that ‘[t]he 
killing of combatants in war is justifiable […], only where the war itself is legal. But when a 
war is illegal, […] there is nothing to justify at the killing, […]’.101 And since Nazi-Germany 
waged an unjust war of aggression against the Allies, a combatant in service of Nazi-Germany 
had no other option than to surrender himself to the Allied forces. Therefore, between 
combatants of the parties to the conflict, there is no moral equality because only the just side is 
justified to use deadly force.  
 Taking everything into account, ‘the liability to be killed presupposes a high degree of 
responsibility for contributing to an unjustified threat, so many unjust combatants, as well as 
almost all unjust noncombatants, are not liable to be killed in war’.102 Hence, the theory of 
moral equality of combatants is wrong, revisionists argue. The result is that war will diminish 
in scale, but also in numbers, for it is impossible to fight a just war without intentionally killing 
many innocent people, if we were to employ the moral equality of combatants as a measuring 
instrument to assess the justification of taking someone’s life. Its methodology is similar to that 
of traditionalism, because it takes discrimination, necessity, and proportionality into 
consideration, but it is based on different premises that result in different outcomes. In effect, 
the reductive individualist theory collapses into pacifism. 
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 However, it is not in conformity with the reality of warfare, in which just combatants 
kill innocent civilians too, or pose a threat to them, by merely being in their proximity. Uwe 
Steinhoff argues that ‘“unjust” soldiers do not act wrongly when they kill the “just” soldiers 
and thereby protect innocent bystanders against an unjust threat’.103 It seems to imply a just 
combatant, an adjective that he derives from the cause of the war he is fighting for: a status ius 
ad bellum. The second meaning of just is an adjective that he derives from his conduct in 
warfare; how he is fighting the war: a status ius in bello. It is necessary to keep the distinction 
in mind. Unjust soldiers are soldiers from the party to the conflict which wages an unlawful war 
in terms of ius ad bellum, while the just soldiers are soldiers from that is battling against the 
unlawful opponent, and unjust threat meaning that the threat is unlawful conduct of warfare in 
terms of ius in bello. Consequently, when McMahan argues that it is morally wrong for just 
soldiers to kill innocent civilians, even when the cause is just, Steinhoff argues that ‘the soldiers 
are at best justified, but that does not make them innocent in the relevant sense’, while actually 
he means that these soldiers are justified for the just cause they are fighting for (ius ad bellum), 
but the manner in which they use violence, is not a matter of just of unjust, but of guilty and 
innocent of unlawful taking someone’s right to life (ius in bello).104 According to Coates, 
innocence in the context of distinguishing civilians from soldiers means not blameless but rather 
harmless.105 Steinhoff’s approach comes close to Walzer’s moral equality of combatants.106 
Steinhoff seems to make no distinction between the lawfulness of the war and the combatant 
who fights the war. What is important is the conduct of combatants, which establishes some 
equality among combatants. But it is ‘often impossible to draw a clear moral line of culpability 
between the soldier and the civilian’.107 Furthermore, since non-combatants ‘are defenseless 
against attack, and, in killing noncombatants, one takes a greater [moral] risk of killing an 
innocent person than when killing combatants’.108 How will combatants be able to tell the 
difference? I believe that if moral equality of combatants is non-existent and civilians are drawn 
into battle, the moral laws of war are hard to comply with. To comply with the principle of 
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distinction as it is formulated by the revisionists is too much to ask for. In no way combatants 
are able to recognise liable civilians and innocent combatants in combat, for they would have 
to know what made these people liable in the first place. Lazar believes that ‘[o]utside of war, 
the principles governing the use of force that have the best long-run consequences are the very 
restrictive ones with which we are all familiar. If we carry those over to war, we get disastrous 
results because of the scale of the violence and the widespread predictable noncompliance’.109 
To solve the problem of non-compliance, ‘[t]he right principles are those which will in fact 
have the best consequences in the long run’ and those ‘best principles for war are something 
close to Walzer’s orthodoxy (this would fit with a lesser evil justification)’.110 Traditionalism 
is better equipped to protect the right of life of civilians, for it does not draw civilians in the 
moral world of warfare. We have to protect civilians with moral norms in warfare. 
 
2.3. Interim conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to assess which theory of warfare implements moral norms in 
warfare in the right way, specifically the right to life and the right to kill in warfare. Realism 
denies the existence of any moral norm in war, including the right to life of civilians. Pacifism 
is the very opposite, denying that there is any justification to kill in a war, and stating that the 
only option is to employ non-violent resistance. It renders towards unintended killings of 
civilians when the adversary upholds no comparable moral conviction. Traditionalism holds 
the right theory on the right to life and right to kill in warfare. The way traditionalism makes a 
distinction between those who are liable to attack and those who own a right to kill, is best in 
minimising collateral damage to civilians. Revisionism denies the moral equality of 
combatants, but I have argued that denying this doctrine, will not provide better protection for 
civilians. I conclude that the traditionalist approach of moral equality of combatants and the 
distinction between combatants and civilians reign supreme. In the third chapter, I will explore 
how traditionalism protects the lives of innocent civilians with its proposed Doctrine of Double 
Effect. 
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3. The Doctrine of Double Effect 
 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that the traditionalism is the right theory of warfare. It 
provides the right understanding of war, and it implements moral norms, especially the right to 
life and right to kill. In the final chapter, I will explore which moral norms are implemented by 
traditionalism to minimalise collateral damage to civilians. First, I will trace the origins of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. After that, I will explain why the Doctrine of Double Effect is 
necessary to include into the moral norms of warfare if we accept traditionalism. After that, I will 
explore different formulations of the Doctrine, and formulate the best version to minimalise 
collateral damage. I will illustrate my reformulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect with a case 
study. 
 
3.1. The traditionalist Doctrine of Double Effect 
I will start with the origins of the Doctrine of Double Effect, first discussing the contemporary 
laws of war and traditionalism, and explain why the Doctrine of Double Effect must be accepted 
in the traditionalist theory, and second, I will trace its Catholic origins.  
 I have argued that traditionalism is sometimes referred to as legalism. I will first take a 
glance on contemporary laws of war. In the preface to the first edition of his work Just and 
Unjust Wars, Walzer states that ‘positive international law is radically incomplete’.111 At the 
time of his writing international law on warfare was limited. Walzer wrote his book in 1977, 
and since then, new protocols of international humanitarian law are adopted. One notable 
codification of the laws of war, was the combatant’s right to kill. It is stated that ‘in order to 
ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives’.112 Whether directing operations includes a right to kill, 
requires a historical interpretation of the law, for which drafts and notes as an addition to 
positive law are observed. It is assumed that ‘direct their operations only against military 
objectives’ is synonymous ‘limitation of attacks on military objectives’.113 Attack in positive 
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law is formulated as ‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence’, 
thereby including the right to kill enemy combatants.114 The laws of war codify the obligation 
to make a distinction between combatants and civilians, similar to traditionalism.  
 But this does not counter Walzer’s criticism that positive international law is radically 
incomplete. Walzer’s criticism is aimed at the incompleteness of the law concerning the 
combatant’s right to kill. As stated earlier, combatants must make a distinction between 
civilians and combatants, and direct their attacks only to the latter. But that does not mean that 
the obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians is a prohibition to kill civilians. 
It is more nuanced than that, as I will explain. The contemporary laws of war forbid targeting 
civilians directly and attacking them as a prime target, but not killing civilians as collateral 
damage during the direct attack of a military objective.115 The laws of war state additional 
conditions and limitations, such as means and methods of warfare that are inherently 
indiscriminate, or expected to be indiscriminate, because they cause incidental loss of civilian 
life which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.116 While the exact meanings of some prohibitions are indisputable, it seems that 
the major limitation on the combatant’s right to kill, such as the principle of proportionality, are 
far from crystal clear. It lies at the heart of one of Walzer’s criticisms on the contemporary laws 
of war, by stating that ‘they [the laws of war] leave the cruellest decisions to be made by the 
men on the spot with reference only to their ordinary moral notions or the military traditions of 
the army in which they serve’.117 
 ‘The moral doctrine most often invoked in such cases [i.e. collateral damage] is the 
principle [Doctrine] of Double Effect’.118 According to Hurka, the Doctrine of Double Effect 
must be included in the laws of war in order to accept the Just War theory. Hurka states: ‘In my 
view double effect gives the best grounding for the targeted/collateral distinction, but I cannot 
rule out a priori the possibility of alternative groundings’.119 What is problematic about this 
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statement, is that Hurka does not argue why the Just War theory would be unacceptable without 
a Doctrine of Double Effect. I will argue why a Doctrine of Double Effect is necessary. The 
Just War theory depends on the separation of ius ad bellum and ius in bello. In order to comply 
with the ius in bello norms, each party to the conflict must impose legitimate force to enemy 
combatants. If a party violates norms by using force that is unnecessarily brutal, and does not 
respect the moral right to life, one cannot justify its wrongdoing with the argument that their 
cause of war is just. Therefore, if one assumes that the Just War theory is valid, then one must 
assume at least the moral equality of combatants and the fact that civilians are excluded from 
using force, leading to an obligation to make a distinction. I have argued that in order to do 
justice to the Just War theory, the right to kill must be regulated in such a way that the right to 
life remains respected. If the right to life is infringed or it is suspected that it will be infringed 
by an act of lethal force, this act of force must be restricted by the conditions that protect the 
right to life. The practical application of these conditions leads me to argue in favour of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. I will now explore what the Doctrine is. 
 The Doctrine of Double Effect is a moral doctrine that justifies an act that causes 
unintended bad effects with intended good effects. Includes both a deontological-style rule that 
civilians must not be targeted directly, and includes a consequentialist-style principle of 
proportionality whenever civilians are unintendedly harmed. Warren Quinn defines the 
Doctrine of Double Effect as follows: ‘The pursuit of good tends to be less acceptable where a 
resulting harm is intended as a means than where it is merely foreseen’.120 He states that it is 
possible to reformulate the principle in terms of a harmful result that is directly and indirectly 
intended, or an act of harming that is directly and indirectly intended. 121  
 Most scholars believe that the Doctrine of Double Effect originates from Catholicism, 
including Augustine and Aquinas.122 Aquinas is aware that an act can have effects that are not 
intended. Aquinas believes that moral acts should be assessed ‘according to what is intended, 
and not according to what is besides the intention, since it is accidental’.123 Aquinas’ case study 
of self-defence suggests, that the intended effect is saving one’s life, the other is slaying the 
aggressor. It is not unlawful to save one’s life, thus the intention was good. ‘And yet, though 
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion 
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to the end’.124 What does Aquinas mean with out of proportion? In the case of self-defence, the 
act is unlawful if one uses more than necessary violence, otherwise, one will exceed the limits 
of a blameless defence. Yet, I must keep in mind that this is an unintended result of an act. 
Intended killing a man in self-defence is unlawful, ‘except for such as have public authority, 
who while intending to kill a man in self-defence, refer this to the public good, as in the case of 
a soldier fighting against the foe’.125 As such, Quinn summarises the common conception of 
the Doctrine of Double Effect:  
 
 1. The intended final end must be good. 
 2. The intended means to it must be morally acceptable. 
 3. The foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, in some sense 
 intended). 
 4. And, the good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot (that is, must be important 
 enough to justify the bad upshot).126 
 
Quinn states, however, that the fourth condition must be left out, for he believes that the 
Doctrine of Double Effect is not so much concerned with justifying the secondary effects of a 
choice, but with justifying the secondary effects with the structure of the intention.127 This 
standpoint is similar to Steinhoff’s, whom disagrees with McMahan’s justification of good acts 
with bad effects on the basis of proportionality.128 While Aquinas already provides military 
examples in his writings, Walzer, too, believes that the ‘Double Effect is a way of reconciling 
the absolute prohibition against attacking noncombatants with the legitimate conduct of military 
activity’.129 His formulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect is as follows: ‘It is permitting to 
perform an act likely to have evil consequences (the killing of noncombatants) provided 
following the four conditions hold: 
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 1. The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means, for our purposes, that it 
 is a legitimate act of war. 
 2. The direct effect is morally acceptable – the destruction of military supplies, for 
 example, or the killing of enemy soldiers. 
 3. The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the 
 evil is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends. 
 4. The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect; it must 
 be justifiable under Sidgwick’s proportionality rule.130 
 
3.2. Proportionality and due care 
According to Walzer, the third condition is insufficient to prevent collateral deaths that 
combatants may cause by exercising their right to kill in warfare. He argues that having a certain 
aim that is good in its intentions, is enough to suffice the third condition. Therefore, foreseeing 
collateral deaths in combination with a good intention (say: a direct military advantage 
anticipated) is enough to meet the conditions of the Doctrine of Double Effect. ‘The Doctrine 
of Double Effect provides a blanket justification’, in which the act – the combatant’s exercise 
of the right to kill – is ‘only subjected to the proportionality rule’.131 It is for this reason that 
Walzer argues that the Doctrine of Double Effect needs to be corrected towards ‘a double 
intention: first, that the “good” be achieved; second, that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far 
as possible’.132 So, Walzer is convinced that he third condition should be stated as: 
  
 3. The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; 
 the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, aware of the 
 evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting the costs to himself.133 
 
The difference between the original formulation and the reformulation of the third condition is 
that there is a positive commitment to save the lives of innocent civilians. It is insufficient to 
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comply with the positive commitment by applying the proportionality rule. Instead, no more 
human’s right to life can be violated for trivial purposes. The positive commitment grants 
innocent civilians some right of due care. Like the proportionality rule, the right of due care is 
a utilitarian calculation, but a calculation on different premises.134 Both conditions supplement 
each other. For example, imagine a situation in which all possible care has been taken to spare 
innocent civilians, but where military necessity outweighs the unintended bad effects. In that 
case, the proportionality rule can outlaw the attack anyway. Consequently, and contrary to 
Quinn, Walzer does not exclude the proportionality rule from the Doctrine of Double Effect. 
 How should proportionality in the Doctrine of Double Effect be assessed? According to 
Hurka, the rule of proportionality as a condition of the Doctrine of Double Effect does not 
involve the distinction between causing harm and failing to prevent it’, but the ‘distinction 
between targeting people for harm and harming them collaterally’.135 This means that the moral 
value of the collateral damage estimation may vary between the number of combatants who are 
attacked and the number of civilians who will die in the process as collateral damage. 
 In Hurka’s view, the Doctrine of Double Effect is included in the laws of war since the 
adoption of the of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.136 Just like Aquinas and 
Lazar, Hurka believes that there are three ius in bello conditions: the discrimination condition, 
the necessity condition, and the proportionality condition. The discrimination condition 
distinguishes between those people who are and those who are not legitimate targets of military 
force.137 The discrimination condition does not forbid killing of civilians, only targeting them 
directly. Therefore, two additional conditions must be included in order to minimalise collateral 
damage to innocent civilians: the necessity condition and the proportionality condition. 
According to Hurka, the Doctrine of Double Effect includes both conditions.138 As stated 
earlier, an attack is indiscriminate – and therefore, prohibited – when the attack ‘may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. The intention of the attack is good, namely: 
it is aimed only at enemy combatants, which is an acceptable effect. However, it is possible that 
an attack can cause collateral damage. If the collateral damage is too excessive, evil may not be 
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the intention of the combatant, or his end is evil, but his means – that is to say: excessive 
collateral damage – is evil in itself. The yardstick of proportionality is the military necessity, 
which refers to ius ad bellum considerations.139  
 
3.3. Liability and agency 
One who argues against the idea that the Doctrine of Double Effect justifies collateral killings, 
is Steinhoff. Steinhoff argues that the Doctrine of Double Effect cannot justify collateral 
damage to non-combatants.140 Steinhoff believes that the Doctrine of Double Effect cannot 
justify unintentional killings of civilians as a part of collateral damage, just like it cannot be 
justified to intentional kill civilians. He provides three claims. First, Steinhoff does not think 
that ‘an attack on someone who is not liable to attack could nevertheless be just’.141 Second, 
Steinhoff argues that ‘the DDE has suffered devastating criticism in recent years, and any like 
principle that could support such an argument [to justify unintentional attacks to civilians] is 
not in sight’.142 Third, Steinhoff criticises the way the Doctrine of Double Effect is understood 
and is used ‘to state criteria under which an act with bad side-effects would be justified’.143 I 
will discuss Steinhoff’s claims. 
 I will reformulate his first claim: ‘An attack on someone who is not liable to attack is 
not just’. An attack that is not just, does not refer to the justness of the war itself, but to the 
conduct of the war. It is confusing that Steinhoff uses just and unjust, that are both applicable 
in ius ad bellum and ius in bello. In this case, he means not just in ius in bello, which I will call 
wrong. McMahan, defending the Doctrine of Double Effect against Steinhoff views that if an 
attack that hits those who are not liable is not wrong, then that would mean that innocent 
bystanders are liable to attack.144 Steinhoff refutes the argument by stating that it cannot be 
possible in McMahan’s philosophical framework for innocent bystanders to be liable to attack, 
for he also claims that contribution to the war effort is central to liability.145 Additionally, 
McMahan claims that ‘those responsible for the wrong to be prevented or rectified are liable to 
attack; otherwise, there is no good cause. Yet these people are not liable to attack as a means of 
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pricing non-just-cause goods’.146 According to Steinhoff, these propositions do not line up. It 
seems a convincing argument, however, I have to mention that the attack McMahan and 
Steinhoff are talking about is an intended and direct attack on a military target, with unintended 
and indirect collateral damage to the innocent bystander as a consequence. The phrase ‘an attack 
on someone who is not liable’ is more nuanced than Steinhoff wants us to believe. In my view 
Steinhoff is lumping up two different types of attacks: unintended and indirect collateral 
damage to the innocent bystander (the problem I want to address), and an intended and direct 
attack on a non-responsible combatant (to which Steinhoff refers). It is true that there is no 
distinction between the lack of liabilities of an innocent bystander and a non-responsible 
combatant in the revisionist theory, however, the distinction of the two propositions lies in the 
intendedness and directedness of the attack to them. Steinhoff’s first claim does not make a 
distinction between (un)intendedness and (in)directedness. His claim against the Doctrine of 
Double does not hold. 
 Steinhoff’s second claim, that the Doctrine of Double Effect has suffered devastating 
criticism, is not a proper convincing counterargument. Criticism alone does not render it a false 
theory. Furthermore, Steinhoff offers no explanation for his argument. Therefore, Steinhoff’s 
second argument does not hold either. 
 Steinhoff’s third claim, that the Doctrine of Double Effect states criteria under which an 
act with bad side-effects would be justified, does hold in part. Steinhoff does not determine 
whether an act as formulated is just or unjust in the meaning of ius ad bellum. In the Just War 
theory, ius ad bellum and ius in bello are strictly separate. First, I believe that Steinhoff argues 
that not justified means a violation of moral rules in accordance with ius in bello. I believe that 
bad [side-effects] cumulates with unintended, for an unintended bad side-effect could be 
justified, indeed, in accordance with the Doctrine of Double Effect, as long as it is proportionate 
to the military necessity. Intentional killing of a civilian cannot be justified with a successful 
claim on the Doctrine of Double Effect, even if the attack was proportionate to the military 
necessity. To conclude, I argue that Steinhoff is in part right that the Doctrine of Double Effect 
cannot justify the violation of ius in bello rules on the right to life. I argue also that the 
justification of the Doctrine of Double Effect is irrelevant whenever it is about to justify a direct 
attack against a military target with unintended collateral damage, as long as it complies with 
the proportionality rule. But it seems to me that Steinhoff, with regard to the first and third 
argument, is lumping up relevant and irrelevant elements of different arguments together, in 
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order to counter McMahan’s viewpoint. I do not support Steinhoff’s claims. I will continue with 
Quinn, before I return to the formulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect.   
 Quinn believes that it is hard to make a distinction between intended and unintended is 
hard.147 The problem of distinguishing between the intentional and unintentional determines 
the soundness of the theory of the Doctrine of Double Effect, according to Quinn.148 Quinn 
argues that we should not look at the closeness of the connection between that which is intended 
and the resulting foreseen harm, because it presents two additional problems.149 The first 
problem is that the Doctrine of Double Effect will depend on how the choice of the intention is 
described. I agree with Quinn’s first argument, for if we take Walzer’s reformulated third 
condition, it is hard to know objectively what one’s intention was or whether he was aware of 
the evil involved at the moment he had to make a moral judgment. We can only ask the 
combatant ex post facto what his intention was during the attack, and hope that he is telling the 
truth. The second problem is that discriminating against a choice, in which anything that is 
strictly intended is also closely connected with death and harm, will make uninviting moral 
distinctions.150 I will illustrate the problem of closeness with Quinn’s thought experiment, 
which concerns two examples: one is about strategic bombing and the second is about terror 
bombing. In the first example, a pilot is about to bomb an enemy factory in order to destroy its 
productive capacity, but in doing this, he foresees that he will kill innocent civilians who live 
nearby. In the second example a pilot is about to deliberately kill innocent civilians in order to 
demoralise the enemy.151 Both attacks foresee the same harm done to innocent civilians, but the 
intentions of the attacks differ. Is the intention of the strategic bomber pilot morally superior 
compared to the intention of the terror bomber pilot? It is quite difficult to compare the 
intentions of the bomber pilots if we look at the effects of the bombings. Can we solve the 
strategic bomber case with Walzer’s reformulated third condition? Walzer’s answer would be 
that the foreseen harm of the strategic bomber pilot seems to be a means to his end (evil), and 
he seeks to minimalise this evil. But I am not convinced. 
 Quinn provides a solution to the problem of closeness. What does that mean for the 
moral agent? Quinn argues that the Doctrine of Double Effect gives each person some veto 
 
147 Quinn 1993, p. 176. 
148 Quinn 1993, p. 183. 
149 Quinn 1993, pp. 179-181.  
150 Quinn 1993, p. 180. 
151 Quinn 1993, p. 177. 
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power over a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better place at his expense.152 But the 
extent of the power of the veto depends on the agency of the innocent civilian. There are three 
types of agencies: direct harmful agency, indirect harmful agency and direct eliminative agency. 
Military targets share a direct harmful agency. Conducting an attack against a direct harmful 
agency is in accordance with the military necessity. But an innocent civilian in the vicinity of a 
direct harmful agency presents a problem for the decision of the combatant to conduct an attack. 
Innocent civilians share an indirect harmful agency. An indirect harmful agent may not be 
attack. The indirect harmful agent confirms the Kantian prohibition of treating someone as a 
means to an end, the direct harmful agency confirms the purpose of using someone as an end 
in itself.153 The Kantian distinction reveals to some extent the reason why – intuitively – using 
someone as an end in itself would have a stronger right against direct harmful agency than 
against indirect harmful agency. Therefore, an innocent civilian in the vicinity of a military 
target presents a strategic problem. The agency of the innocent prevents the military from 
conducting military operations and reaching their goals. Quinn argues that if an innocent 
civilian prevents the military from conducting its operation and reaching its military goal, 
provided that the harm which is caused is a lesser evil, the indirect harmful agency will change 
to a direct eliminative agency.154 The theory of direct eliminative agency does not use a victim, 
but is only sees it as an obstacle. It also explains why innocent civilians are not liable to be 
intended and directly attacked, but they can fall victim as unintended and indirect collateral 
casualties. I will reformulate the Doctrine of Double Effect as follows: 
 
 1. The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, that is a legitimate act of war. 
 2. The direct effect is morally acceptable if it leads to the destruction of direct harmful 
 agencies. 
 3. The intention of the actor is good. He aims narrowly at the acceptable effect, namely 
 the destruction of direct harmful agencies. Evil towards indirect harmful agencies is not 
 one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends. Aware of the evil involved and accepting 
 the costs to himself, he seeks to minimalise the evil against indirect harmful agency by 
 imposing force only to direct eliminative agencies. 
 4. The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect. 
 
152 Quinn 1993, pp. 192-193. 
153 Kant 1997, para 4:429. 
154 Quinn 1993, pp. 186, 192. 
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How does the Doctrine of Double Effect work with real life cases? Let me illustrate the 
workings of the Doctrine of Double Effect with a historical example. 
 
3.4. Case study: The Doolittle Raid 
After the surprise attack of Imperial Japan on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on 7 
December 1941, the United States of America was drawn into the Second World War. Since 
the American naval fleet suffered a devastating blow, it desperately needed a victory. 
Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle devised a plan to use sixteen army bomber planes to launch 
them from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet in order to undertake a small bombing on Tokyo and 
four other cities on the Japanese mainland on 18 April 1942 at noon.155 While the material 
damage was neglectable – no more than fifty citizens perished, four hundred wounded, and two 
hundred houses burned – the psychological effect of the bombing was tremendous.156 Japan 
was not invaded or attacked for almost seven hundred years, which strengthened the idea that 
Imperial Japan was invincible. Doolittle himself noted: 
 
 The Japanese people had been told they were invincible – an attack on the Japanese 
 homeland would cause confusion in the minds of the Japanese people and sow doubt 
 about the reliability of their leaders. There was a second, and equally important 
 psychological reason for the attack – Americans badly needed a morale boost.157 
 
The strategic effect of the Doolittle Raid was minor. However, some suggest that the Imperial 
General Headquarters realised that their home defences were inadequate to repel Allied aerial 
fleets. Thus, Doolittle Raid may have contributed unintendedly to the Japanese investments in 
home defences that subtracted vital resources from their offensive capabilities.158 Eventually, 
the Doolittle Raid was hallmarked as the start of a series of extreme violent aerial bombings on 
the Japanese mainland by the Allied forces to force them into submission and to end the Second 
World War. 
 One could argue that the Doolittle Raid was a terror bombing, for it deliberately targeted 
the Japanese population in order to achieve psychological advantages, such as plant a seed of 
 
155 Coox 1994, p. 391. 
156 Coox 1994, p. 394. 
157 Doolittle & Glines 1991, pp. 1-2. 
158 Coox 1994, p. 395. 
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doubt in the minds of the Japanese population. Opponents could argue that the Doolittle Raid 
was a strategic bombing, because it resulted – unintendedly – into a change of tactics of the 
Japanese Imperial Forces. For the sake of argument, let us assume that it was a terror bombing. 
To morally condone the Doolittle Raid, one should meet all the cumulative conditions of the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. First, an aerial bombing was – at that time – a legitimate act of force. 
The Doolittle Raid targeted Tokyo’s nearby industry, with few bombs off target, and therefore 
targeted civilians not indiscriminately. The Doolittle Raid meets the first condition. Second, the 
factories and infrastructure of the military industry were the prime targets of the bombers, which 
led to the destruction of direct harmful agencies. The Doolittle Raid meets the second condition, 
too. The third condition concerns the good intention of the attacker. An intention is good if the 
attacker aims narrowly to the destruction of direct harmful agencies. Evil towards indirect 
harmful agencies is not a means to his end. Fifty civilians died during the raid, which should be 
expected whenever factories are bombed when the workforce is present. However, it was not 
feasible for Doolittle to depart earlier or later from the aircraft carrier to avoid hitting the 
workforce, because the aircraft carrier was intercepted by a Japanese patrol vessel. Doolittle’s 
aim may be narrow, the evil effects of the raid cannot be ignored. If evil effects to innocent 
civilians cannot be justified as a direct eliminative agency, then the attacker should accept the 
costs to himself in order to minimalise evil to indirect harmful agencies. And I believe that the 
Doolittle Raid cannot overcome this problem. The same psychological effects would be attained 
when the raid was conducted at night in order to minimalise collateral damage to the 
workforce.159 It is true that the aircraft carrier was intercepted, but the Imperial Japanese Navy 
disregarded the belief that the United States Navy was able to conduct air raids on its homeland. 
A second attempt to launch Doolittle’s fleet was certainly not unimaginable. The Doolittle Raid 
failed the third condition of the Doctrine of Double Effect. But, for the sake of argument, let’s 
say the third condition has been met in order to assess the fourth condition. The fourth condition 
includes the rule of proportionality. Apart from psychological advantages, and a hypothetical 
strategic advantage which was not anticipated prior to the raid, the military advantage of the 
Doolittle Raid was in no proportion to the casualties it caused. The Doolittle Raid may have 
been proportional if the evil imposed to the innocents was reduced to an appropriate minimum 
by – for example – conducting it at night. Thus, based on both the third and fourth conditions, 
 
159 It is true that the workforce lived in the vicinity of the factories in worker’s housings. A bomb that misses its 
target could damage such housings. However, I still believe that a nocturnal bombing would lessen the number of 
casualties.  
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the Doctrine of Double Effect does not justify the use of the combatant’s right to kill against 
the innocents’ right to life during the Doolittle Raid. 
 
3.5. Interim conclusion 
Traditionalism prescribes the Doctrine of Double Effect as a norm to minimalise collateral 
damage to innocent civilians. I have proposed to make additions to the Doctrine of Double 
Effect as it was first formulated by Catholic scholars, in order to account for all situations that 
one encounters in war. Walzer argues that the rule of proportionality was not able to serve as a 
doctrine in which the military stakes were high, for the necessity would outweigh the right to 
life of the innocent. It was, therefore, necessary to include a judgment of due care. Quinn argues 
that the rule of proportionality must be left out, because it should be focussed on intention rather 
than choice. Walzer does include proportionality as the fourth condition. I favour Walzer’s 
standpoint on two accounts. First, the condition of proportionality includes the principle of 
proportionality, that is part of the justification of the infringement of the right to life. Second, 
the judgment of due care and the condition of proportionality do not protect the same interest, 
and they supplement each other. For these reasons, the condition of proportionality must remain 
in the Doctrine of Double Effect. The final addition is the distinction between agencies of the 
victims. The Doctrine of Double Effect should not be too restrictive. Therefore, there is a 
distinction between direct harmful agencies and indirect harmful agencies, of whom the latter 
may not be attacked. However, when the indirect harmful agency prevents the military from 
conducting operations, only the right to life of the indirect eliminative agency is overridden by 
the sufficiently greater good, which is the lesser evil justification. 
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Conclusion 
 
‘Humanity will require that the greatest precaution should be used against involving the 
innocent in danger’.160 Hugo Grotius was the starting position of this thesis. In every war, 
humanity sinks to its deepest point. Many innocent civilians get killed unintentionally during 
the hostilities. I needed a theory of warfare to minimalise collateral damage to civilians. Theories 
of warfare are theories of the relationship between war and morality, thus the right theory must 
both understand the nature of war and implement moral norms of the right to life and the right 
to kill in the right way. Arguing in favour of one of the four theories of warfare leads to the 
application of the right moral norms, such as deontological and utilitarian norms in order to 
protect those rights. Specifically, the moral norms that protect the lives of civilians in warfare 
against intended and unintended killings as a result of collateral damage were researched. There 
are several norms that limit the conduct of hostilities, of which moral norms have intrinsic 
value. Legal norms were of no interest in this research, except as a comparison to moral norms. 
 In the first chapter, I have argued that exceptionalism and collectivism describe the 
nature of war better than reductivism and individualism. I have concluded that the combination 
of exceptionalism and collectivism leaded me to assume the Just War theory. To argue in favour 
of the Just War theory leaded me to assume the validity of the doctrine of the moral equality of 
combatants. As such, I had to find the theory which fitted the description best, and which 
include both the Just War theory and the moral equality of combatants. I have argued that 
traditionalism is the right theory to describe war, whereas realism, pacifism, and revisionism 
are not. The theoretical framework of traditionalism is based on two criteria: morality in war is 
exceptional, and morality in war is collective. The theory formulates the assumption that there 
is a strict separation of ius ad bellum and ius in bello. Consequently, the merits of the moral 
judgment of a combatant are based on his conduct in the war, irrespective of whether a war is 
just or unjust. The framework of traditionalism leads to the acceptance of the Just War theory.  
 In the second chapter, I had to assess which theory implements morality right in order 
to protect the right to life of the civilian and respect the right to kill of the combatant. I have 
again assessed realism, pacifism, traditionalism, and revisionism to cope with the dilemma of 
the right to life and the right to kill in war. To favour a theory of warfare has its implications 
on the moral norms it governs. I have argued that traditionalism implements morality in 
accordance with the description of warfare the theory gives. Traditionalism grants every 
 
160 Grotius 2001, para III.XI.8. 
50 
 
combatant an equal right to kill, which is called the moral equality of combatants. It ensures 
that every combatant, and combatants alone, can use their right to kill against other combatants, 
regardless of their contribution to the war effort. Civilians are out of reach. The traditionalist 
framework cannot prevent all collateral deaths as a result of the conduct of hostilities, but 
neither can realism, pacifism, and revisionism. What traditionalism can do and does best is to 
minimalise collateral damage to civilians during hostilities, as opposed to the other theories of 
warfare.  
 In the third chapter I have explored different formulations of the Doctrine of Double 
Effect. The methodology of traditionalism to minimalise collateral damage is to implement 
moral norms into the Doctrine of Double Effect. The Doctrine of Double Effect can be 
formulated in different versions. I have argued which condition to include and which condition 
to leave out, in order to formulate the right version of the Doctrine of Double Effect. The 
following conditions have been included. First, direct and intended attacks against civilians are 
forbidden. If a combatant is at the verge of attacking a military target, the combatant takes due 
care and aims narrowly at the acceptable effect. If the intended good of the attack is in sharp 
contrast with the collateral costs, the proportionality rule calls off the attack. Directing an 
intended attack against innocents is off limit. An indirect attack which results in unintended 
casualties may be favoured by the Doctrine of Double Effect, depending on the circumstances. 
The agencies of the casualties help in the targeting process, assessing whose agency is directly 
harmful and whose is indirectly eliminative. 
 The research question was which theory of warfare is theoretically acceptable and 
minimalises collateral damage during hostilities, and which moral norms does that theory of 
warfare implement to minimalises collateral damage. I have argued in favour of traditionalism 
as the theoretically acceptable theory of warfare to minimalise collateral damage to innocent 
civilians. Traditionalism’s answer to the problem of collateral damage is the Doctrine of Double 
Effect. I have argued that the Doctrine of Double Effect minimalises collateral damage to 
innocent civilians against collateral damage caused during hostilities, thereby assuming that 
those who hold the same moral conviction comply with the prescribed moral norms. The 
Doctrine of Double Effect implements deontological moral norms, such as the prohibition on 
intentionally directing attacks against civilians, and consequentialist moral norms, such as the 
principle of proportionality and due care. The Doctrine of Double effect is able to protect the 
moral right to life of innocents, while at the same time providing combatants a right to kill in 
warfare. The Doctrine of Double Effect minimalises collateral damage to civilians. 
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 Even to this day, innocents die unintentionally during hostilities. The tragedies of the 
many convert to statistics, after which war-makers base their judgments on whether they should 
wage a new war. They invent new means and methods of warfare, and prohibit the 
indiscriminate ones in the course of history, yet each dead man tells no tale. How do you say 
‘don’t shoot!’ in the language of war that every participant understands? Morality is the lingua 
franca in war with moral norms as its vocabulary and the Doctrine of Double Effect as its 
grammar. The Doctrine of Double Effect must provide any combatant a moral code to choose 
between taking innocent lives in the pursuit of military operations, or sparing them and risking 
losing the battle, the war, or even his own life. 
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